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This study examines the current effectiveness of measures
utilized by Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA)
,
Norfolk to enhance productivity through capital investment.
Included is a brief history of the Productivity Enhancing
Capital Investment (PECI) Program and the effects of past
legislation by the Department of Defense (DoD) , leading to
the current program within the Department of the Navy (DON)
.
The analysis includes opinions and impressions of various
levels of management within the organizational structure of
SIMA. This study culminates with a discussion of the current
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The present Department of Defense (DoD) productivity
program represents over 75 years of improvement efforts. Yet
even with all the emphasis on work measurement and labor
saving devices, the Department of the Navy (DON) continues
to face problems in the management of its productivity pro-
gram. As was done in the past, the question has to be asked
as to whether or not the Navy program lacks management empha-
sis and resources. Is productivity enhancement working in
Naval activities? Specifically, is productivity enhancement
working at the Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA)
,
Norfolk?
The last time these issues were raised, the Navy's program
was viewed as unsuccessful. The lack of success was directly
related to inadequate use of management resources and insufficient
emphasis on the potential benefits the program offered. The
result was a comprehensive Plan of Action and Milestones
(POA&M) . Now four years later, the same problems plague the
DON and SIMA. Congressional interest stemming from increased
pressure to reduce the budget deficit and internal concern
that the Productivity Enhancement Capital Investment (PECI)
program is not improving DON efficiency, has resulted in
greater uncertainty as to the future of the PECI program.
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This thesis may provide some further insight into the problem
and the potential solution at SIMA, Norfolk.
B. INTEREST AND PURPOSE
As a student of financial management and a professional
Naval officer, the author was concerned that little was known
about the problem of productivity and its relationship with
the Navy. In fact, the normal Naval officer knows very little
about capital investment and its impact on productivity. In
undertaking this study, it was the intent of the author to
provide, as simply as possible, the purpose of the PECI pro-
gram, the SIMA's existing productivity enhancement program,
shortfalls in the program at SIMA, and the options currently
facing SIMA.
But all the historical development* and early growing pains
within the DoD can almost be considered irrelevant. For what
is needed is an assessment of SIMA's productivity program, and
what can be done to improve it. Therefore, in addition to
conducting literary research, the opinions, impressions,
and thoughts of SIMA's various management levels were included.
Their frankness and genuine concern regarding their own inter-
ests and the interests of SIMA's overall organization were
very much appreciated. Without their input, this work would
be meaningless.
C. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
In analyzing the SIMA in Norfolk several important facts
stand out. First of all, if SIMA is growing, is productive,
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and still is not utilizing the PECI program as designed, then
one would have to seriously question the need for a productivity
program at all. The number of ships SIMA services has in-
creased. The overall quality of workmanship is better due
to increased emphasis on quality assurance. The total number
of jobs in progress has expanded. Yet there is little knowl-
edge or use of the PECI program at SIMA.
The issue is not solely one of output. The ability to
produce greater output with a limited amount of input must
also be considered. With resources diminishing, the number
of surface ships increasing, and limitations on the defense
budget growing annually, productivity enhancement requires
increased emphasis. The ability of the SIMA to continue to
meet their current level of output should be seriously ques-
tioned. The question then becomes what is needed and how
best to achieve it.
D. ASSUMPTIONS
In the writing of this thesis, the author has made the
following assumptions:
1. productivity enhancement is a viable solution to
the issue of scarce resources if increased production
is going to be realized;
2. that, although it would be impossible to interview
everyone involved in the organization of SIMA,
selected interviews from a wide variety of participants
in ship repair and maintenance would provide valuable
insight that is worthy of consideration;
3. productivity enhancement is vital if the SIMA is to




This thesis is divided into an introduction, four research
chapters, and a final chapter of conclusions. Chapter II
provides a historical review of the DoD's productivity enhance-
ment program. Chapter III addresses the Management Control
System (MCS) of the SIMA as it relates to productivity levels
in ship repair and maintenance. Chapter IV provides an over-
view of the productivity measurement tool used by SIMA to
evaluate its effectiveness in ship repair. Chapter V outlines
the opinions of representatives from various levels of SIMA's
management and observations made by the author during on-site
thesis work, both of which indicate obstacles to the success
of productivity at SIMA. Finally, Chapter VI describes the
conclusions of the author based on the research presented in
the preceding chapters. It should be noted that the conclusions
and recommendations are those of the author- and not of the
SIMA representatives interviewed.
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II. BACKGROUND OF POD PRODUCTIVITY
Historically, man has had to deal with technological
advancements. With each development the input of human labor
has generally diminished. Handicraft production gave way
to mass-production, and eventually automation replaced both
of these earlier technologies. Management of scarce resources
grew in intensity as nations attempted to maximize output while
minimizing input. Today, resource management and output
levels are still of vital concern to both private and public
sector industry. In order to understand the current interest
in productivity, particularly in the Department of Defense (DoD)
,
one must be aware of how the need for both efficiency and
effectiveness in government evolved. This chapter is a summary
of the history of the Department of Defense Productivity Pro-
gram and its organizational relationship to the Department of
the Navy (DON)
.
A. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFENSE PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM
Since the turn of this century there has been an ongoing
internal effort within the federal government to improve pro-
ductivity. The first fifty years of this period placed broad
emphasis on many types of measurement programs. The concept
of work measurement, although initially unpopular in govern-
ment, drew support from the successes of similar management
practices in private industry. From 1950 to 1965 cost reduction
15
and resource management were part of a wide range of programs
within DoD aimed at answering the specific problem of command
efficiency and effectiveness.
Finally, legislative interest and a joint study by the
General Accounting Office, the Civil Service Commission, and
the Office of Management and Budget saw the establishment in
1973 of a permanent federal sector program for productivity
measurement [Ref. l:pp. 34-35].
B. DOD PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAM ESTABLISHMENT: 1970-1975
By 1973 productivity enhancement (PE) was a new emphasis
within the Department of Defense. The Army Materiel Command
piloted the first operational evaluation in FY 1973 and the
potential applications were felt in all the services by 1974.
In 1975 DoD acted on the positive feedback it had acquired
from the test programs and permanently established the pro-
ductivity program. Four major elements were identified in
the DoD program:
Productivity measurement and evaluation.
Work methods and measurement improvement.
Productivity enhancing capital investment.
Workforce motivation. [Ref. 2:p. 316]
C. OPERATIONAL OVERVIEW: 1975-1985
From the start, defense productivity aimed at optimum
growth (increase the amount of goods and services produced
relative to the amount of resources used) throughout the
16
Department of Defense [Ref. 3:p. 1] . The objectives of the
program were aimed at three areas:
Promote productivity improvements at all levels of
responsibility.
Foster the use of productivity measurements.
Establishment of a working environment that considers
worker/manager relationships. [Ref. 4:pp. 231-232]
Reorganization, consolidation, and further refinement even-
tually led to issuance of the first productivity directive,
DoDD 5010.31, in 1979. Centralization was the main outcome of
this initial directive. For the first time, in over thirty-
five years, government productivity was organized to achieve
efficiency.
To complement centralized management of productivity, DoD
formed the Defense Productivity Program Office (DPPO) in 1979.
Its primary aim was to integrate all government agencies and
the services under a uniform program. [Ref. 5:p. II-9] By
19 80 the first of many initiatives designed to provide savings
in resources, dollars, and manpower were under review in DoD
and the services.
D. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROGRAM
Responding to DoD directives, the Secretary of the Navy,
along with the other service secretaries, established policies
to support the concept of productivity within DoD. Initially,
the objectives sought to improve readiness at all command
levels. Emphasis was placed on management and organizational
17
performance. Specifically, the program addressed the follow-
ing objectives:
Elevate visibility of productivity as an essential
dimension of management within the DON.
Develop productivity enhancement initiatives as a
means to achieve the highest possible level of readi-
ness within available resources.
Stimulate managers, at all levels of organization,
to focus on the underlying mission of their organi-
zations, to develop valid measures of output, and
explore methodologies to improve organization
performance
.
Create a climate which will lead to the implementation
of a well organized and economically sound produc-
tivity enhancing capital investment program.
Enhance the Quality of Working Life of the Navy's
military and civilian workforce through the estab-
lishment of meaningful incentives and the elimination
of disincentives to productivity.
Foster the utilization of productivity data in pro-
gram, budget and performance evaluation. [Ref. 6:
pp. 1-2]
Parallel implementation of similar objectives occurred
within all the services. Organizationally, each service
established a central point for administration of the program.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower, Reserve Affairs
and Logistics (ASN (MRA&L) ) fulfilled this requirement for
the DON. [Ref. 7:pp. 2-5]
Prior to the implementation of the Defense Productivity
Program (DPP) the main impediment to project funding was the
defense budget process. Therefore, coincident with the issu-
ance of the first DoD directives, the Department of the Navy
established a fund to support Productivity Enhancement (PE)
projects
.
E. DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY'S FUNDING PROGRAM
After 1980 the process of identifying projects for capital
investment began working. Identification of funds to support
these investment initiatives was in development. By 19 82,
the Comptroller of the Navy issued NAVCOMPT INSTRUCTION 7000. 38A,
In addition to addressing the funding source for investments,
policy on amortization of projects and follow-up reporting
criteria were emphasized. These project data were not only
intended to support the initial justification for acquisition,
the same data were also vital to the establishment of a capi-
tal investment data base and an eventual productivity manage-
ment information system (MIS) . The most important points of
the Productivity Enhancing Incentive Fund (PEIF) were:
Funding was provided in the current year.
The two year budget cycle was avoided.
Capital investment, substituted for labor, optimized
the potential output of the work force.
The investment could not exceed $100,000.
- Projects must amortize within two years, of the date
they became operational. [Ref. 8:pp. 1-2]
By FY 81, a second fund, with no upper dollar limit, was
initiated by OSD to meet a perceived problem in the historical
use of the PEIF fund within the services. Thus, within the
first ten years of revitalization, the Navy had provided a
solid foundation of instructions and directives, and the
financial tools necessary to enhance productivity within its
subordinate commands.
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F. THE MAJOR CLAIMANT: COMMANDER, NAVAL SURFACE FORCES
ATLANTIC (CNSL)
Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment (PECI) at the
claimant level is supported through the Other Procurement,
Navy (OPN) budgeting process. Three capital investment areas
are considered:
Operating Forces Support Equipment (OFSE)
;
Industrial Plant Equipment (IPE)
;
Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment (PECI)
.
[Ref. 9]
Administratively, the claimant reinforces productivity
guidance and program objectives by reissuing higher level
instructions from DON, the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV)
,
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Comptroller of the
Navy (NAVCOMPT) . The claimant diverges from broad policy and
provides the administrative guidance necessary for proper
submission of OPN fund requests. The primary vehicle used
to solicit inputs is the budget call. Thus, the major clai-
mant provides an intermediate point for DON to manage capital
investment administratively and financially. In addition,
the claimant oversees PECI performance of the first line
productivity managers.
G. FIRST LINE MANAGERS: SHORE INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE
ACTIVITY (SIMA)
First line managers are the grass roots of the productivity
process. The activity level within the Navy represents a
major source of capital investment. These are the commands
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that are concerned with keeping the operational fleet at
peak readiness . The measure of productivity at this level
is usually based on very judgmental criteria.
At SIMA Norfolk first line managers evaluate shop pro-
ductivity on professional "gut feeling." Characteristics
that support this judgmental estimation focus generally on
personal motivation of shop personnel, skill acquired through
on-the-job experience, and training received through technical
schools. Most of these same managers based considerable
weight on their individual ability to gauge productivity
through visual evaluation of shop activity. This visual
perception was further supported by each manager's knowledge
of jobs in progress and projected completion dates required
to meet the ship's departure from the repair availability.
SIMA also has a software management system which is
designed to track productivity and provide various trend
analysis forecasts, but this management tool generally lacked
credibility in the eyes of the first line manager. Additional
discussion of this software system is provided in Chapter IV.
Defining productivity at the first line manager position
is difficult. This individual is concerned with the minute-
to-minute management decisions he is paid to make. Evaluation
of his division's productivity is "gut feeling" because his
ability to devote time to analysis and better management con-
trol is limited. The next chapter addresses the Management
Control System (MCS) at SIMA, Norfolk.
1 SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia interviews with the Repair
Division Officers, August 1985.
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III. THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
A Management Control System (MCS) is generally designed
based on the organization characteristics and the interaction
which occurs among its employees. Structurally the units in
an MCS are characterized by several types of responsibility
centers. All of these organization units are concerned with
measurement of outputs and inputs. Each center also has a
manager who uses this measurement to evaluate his unit's
performance. Usually responsibility centers focus on a
singular type of measurement. Common types of responsibility
centers are:
Expense Center. Inputs are measured in terms of mone-
tary costs. Outputs are either not measured or they
are measured in terms of money.
Revenue Center. Revenue maximization is the primary
concern. Revenues are measured in monetary terms.
Profit Center. Revenues and expenses are measured to
determine profit.
- Investment Center. Profit and the capital which con-
tributes to profit are measured. [Ref. 10 :p. 26]
The MCS process depicts what the organization does. In
an organization, the daily interaction of workers and manage-
ment can be informal or formal. Employee conversations, or
meetings represent informality, whereas the formal process is
characterized by four distinct but interrelated phases. These
phases of the MCS occur regularly and are adjusted as factors
within the organization change. [Ref. lip. 26]
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The phases of an MCS are:
Programming. This phase shows which, when, and what
amounts of resources will be used in specific organi-
zation programs. These programs generally relate to
the output of goods or services.
Budgeting. This phase is concerned with the operating
budget, which is usually planned for one year.
Reporting and Analysis. This phase represents the data
base of information used by managers at all levels to
predict trends and forecast future needs. Actual per-
formance can be compared with planned performance.
Operating and Measurement. This phase tracks the costs
and the revenues which result from the various programs.
[Ref. 12:pp. 26-28]
Management Control Systems (MCS) in today's organizations
are classified as either "profit-oriented" or "nonprofit. " The
former measures success almost entirely in terms of profita-
bility while the latter views success relative to the amount
and quality of the service rendered. Management decisions
are also biased towards areas that increase profits or improve
service.
Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) , Norfolk
is a "nonprofit" organization. Publicly-oriented, SIMA exists
to render repair service to individual clients, Navy ships.
The measurement of output is a technical problem characteris-
tic of service organizations. [Ref. 13:pp. 1-10]
How much service is provided or how well it is rendered is
more judgmental than quantifiable. The input/output relation-
ship that assures both effective and efficient use of resources
in a profit-oriented organization, is less measurable in the
nonprofit arena. [Ref. 14:pp. 745-753]
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Government and its associated agencies and departments
are service organizations. DoD's service output is national
defense. Internally, the service branches are integrated to
support this end. Within the DON, SIMA Norfolk's input to
national defense is intermediate maintenance for Navy ships.
This chapter is a summary of the Management Control System
(MCS) that exists at SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia.
A. SIMA: ORGANIZATION AND MISSION
The Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) at
Norfolk, Virginia is a repair facility. It services over 150
fleet units of the U.S. Navy based at the Norfolk Naval Base.
All of SIMA's repair equipment, administrative offices, and
logistics and support facilities are housed within a 205,000
square foot complex. From its main facilities located within
the Destroyer and Submarine pier area, SIMA provides both
ship-to-shop repair and onboard repair for Naval ships assigned
2
to the Naval Operating Base (NOB)
.
Functionally, SIMA, Norfolk is a "Shore" Intermediate
Maintenance Activity (IMA) . Navy tenders are classified as
"Afloat" IMA's. Both types of IMA's work under the direction
of Naval Surface Forces Readiness Support Group (RSG) , Norfolk.
The RSG acts as a screening agent for all work assigned to an
IMA. Assignment of ships to an IMA is the responsibility of
2 SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia, telephone interview with the
Repair Officer, September 1985.
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Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic (CNSL) (see Table
3.1) .
The SIMA's organization is pyramidal in design. At the
apex is the Commanding Officer (CO) . The Executive Officer
(XO) exists within the structure to provide continuity to the
chain-of-command. The XO's primary role is administrator.
Operationally, four departments: (1) Repair, (2) Supply,
(3) Administration, and (4) Quality Assurance (QA) fulfill
the needs of ships assigned for availability (see Table 3.2).
Approximately, 1000 military personnel are assigned to
SIMA Norfolk. The majority of these individuals work in one
of eight responsibility centers within the Repair Department.
The remaining personnel work in administration, supply, or
QA. All key managerial positions are staffed by Navy officers
or chief petty officers in pay grades E-8, or E-9.
The SIMA's $8,000,000 annual operating budget supports the
4
command's primary mission of ship repair. The CNSL assigns
ships to three types of repair availabilities:
1. Intermediate Maintenance Availabilities (IMAV).
Routine repair periods designed to maintain a ship's
operational readiness between major overhauls.
2. Selected Restricted Availability (SRA) . An availability
scheduled by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to
accomplish Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEASYSCOM)
alterations (K ALTS) , and specific Type Commander
alterations (D and F ALTS). The SRA's are specific
3
SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia, telephone interview with the
Repair Officer, September 1985.
4
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for each class of ship. The maintenance is usually
performed in a shipyard.
3. Concurrent IMAV. Ships in major overhaul have an IMA
assigned to provide the same type of repair found in
a routine IMAV. This service supplements the indus-
trial work provided by the shipyard.
[Ref. 15:pp. 4711-4712]
The CNSL uses the quarterly employment scheduling con-
ference to assign ships to repair availabilities. Naval
ships come into availability approximately once per quarter.
The usual length of the repair period is three to four weeks,
and during this period ships normally remain pierside.
The SIMA currently services approximately 70 ships per
quarter. On a daily basis 18-21 ships will be in availability
and an additional 8-9 ships will be in a concurrent availa-
7bility or an SRA.
Although ship repair is SIMA's principal mission, it also
is a reserve headquarters for 26 reserve units that drill at
o
SIMA, Norfolk on a routine basis. The remaining discussion
of SIMA's MCS will address the MCS processes that support the
organizational structure and mission.
B. THE MANAGEMENT CONTROL PROCESS
The management control process takes place in an organi-
zation that already exists, that has objectives, and
that has decided on broad policies for achieving these
objectives. [Ref. 16:p. 28]




Much of the management control process involves informal
communications and interactions among managers and
workers. Informal communications occurs by means of
memoranda, meetings, conversations, and even by such
signals as facial expressions. [Ref. 17:p. 26]
. . . most companies also have a formal management
control system, which includes the following inter-
related phases of programming, budgeting, operating
and measurement, and reporting and analysis.
[Ref. 18:p. 26]
The SIMA has both an informal and a formal management
control process. On a day-to-day basis SIMA functions in an
informal environment of meetings. Information flows inter-
nally within departments and between departments. The majority
of the information flow at SIMA involves production status on
ships in availability. Information exchanged between the ship
and SIMA is both informal and formal. Weekly progress meetings,
as well as arrival and departure conferences lend formality
and structure to the routine informal information exchange
that occurs at the actual job repair level.
1. Programming
In the programming phase, decisions are made with respect
to the major programs in which the organization is to
engage during the coming period. . . . Some organizations
state their programs in the form of a "long-range plan"
which shows planned outputs and inputs for a number
of years ahead--usually five years. [Ref. 19 :p. 30]
The programming phase at SIMA addresses both current year
operations and outyear forecasting. Financially, CNSL
annually sends down its budget call to SIMA for both current
year Operations and Maintenance, Navy (0&M,N) and Other Pro-
curement Navy (OPN) funding inputs. Outyear OPN funding
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requests include the current fiscal year and the two subse-
quent fiscal years. Significant emphasis is placed on
screening all OPN requests for possible productivity enhance-
ment applicability.
The quarterly scheduling process conducted at CNSL
takes ship, squadron, and type desk inputs and integrates
the individual concerns of each responsibility level into a
comprehensive fleet matrix which reflects not only operational
and training requirements, but also repair availabilities.
CNSL's input at the scheduling conferences addresses SIMA's
short and long term programs.
The SIMA, via CNSL, is able to project which, when,
and what amounts of resources will be used on each ship that
comes into availability. The joint efforts of all four of
SIMA's major departments work towards maintaining fleet
readiness through ship repair.
The SIMA's budget request to CNSL then travels the
circuits of the DoD Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) . The PECI fund codes, Productivity Enhancement Incen-
tive Fund (PEIF) and Productivity Investment Fund (PIF) , are
both unique to the PPBS system of budgeting. A more detailed
review of these two fund codes is included in the next seg-
ment on budgeting.
2 . Budgeting
A budget is a plan expressed in quantitative, usually
monetary, terms and covering a specified period of time.
The time period is usually a year. [Ref. 20 :p. 30]
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The SIMA's budget plan, similar to most in DoD, covers
three fiscal years. The Prior Year deals with current year
operational requirements. Primary emphasis is on the 0&M,N
money. The Apportionment Year and the Budget Year cover long
range OPN budget items. Productivity Enhancement (PE) screen-
ing of selected investment equipment occurs in these two out-
years. CNSL solicits submissions from two general areas:
a. Operating Forces Support Equipment (OFSE) . These items
are general purpose equipment which have a unit value
of $3,000 or more, and are not designated for stock
fund management in the central supply system.
b. Industrial Plant Equipment (IPE) . This equipment
has an acquisition cost of $3,000 or more and is used
in the physical, electrical, or chemical alteration
of materials. These items are managed by the Defense
Industrial Plant Equipment Center (DIPEC)
.
[Ref. 21:p. Q-2]
In addition, two types of PECI funds are available:
a. Productivity Investment Funds (PIF) . Projects which
cost $100,000 or more and have a payback period of
4 years or less.
b. Productivity Enhancement Incentive Fund (PEIF)
.
Projects which cost less than $100,000 and have a
payback period of 2 years or less. [Ref. 22 :p. 4]
Both OFSE and IPE investment submissions can be
screened for inclusion in the PECI program. Projects selected
for PEIF funding are financed from drawing accounts estab-
lished with annual appropriations. Thus, under the PECI
program, funded projects, if approved, are realized in the
prior year rather than the two outyears. In addition to the
annual apportionment input, the type commander (TYCOM) , CNSL,
acting as a sub-claimant, issues an expense operating, budget
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(EOB) to SIMA. The SIMA allocates the funds to each responsi-
bility center on a quarterly basis, and the various departments
control the expenditure of funds.
The 0&M,N funds are used at SIMA under the following
conditions
:
a. Repair Other Vessels Indirect (ROVI) . Material drawn/
ordered which cannot be related to a specific job
control number (JCN) for a benefiting ship, but is
used for several ships.
b. Repair Other Vessels Direct (ROVD) . Material drawn/
ordered to carry out a specific JCN for a specific
ship.
c. Own Ship's Use (OSU) . Funds to procure materials and
supplies for general administration of the command.
^
The SIMA responds to the budget call from CNSL with
its own internal budget call. This internal request goes
out to all departments prior to the receipt of CNSL's call.
The Supply Officer consolidates all the department inputs
into a single activity budget, receives the Commanding Offi-
cer's approval, and then forwards the proposed budget to
CNSL.
The end product of these negotiations is a statement
of the outputs that are expected during the budget
year and the resources that are to be used in achieving
these outputs. [Ref. 23:pp. 30-31]
3 . Measurement
During the period of actual operations, records are kept
of resources actually consumed and outputs actually
achieved . . . costs are collected both by programs and
by responsibility center. [Ref. 24 :p. 31]
9 SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia, interview with the Supply
Officer, August 1985.
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The SIMA uses the engineered time values (ETV) sys-
tem for production management. Each department and its
various divisions use supporting computer equipment to input
work processing data from the point of initial receipt of
the work request to the "signing off" of the completed job.
Job tracking information is entered at all user stations.
The Supply Department enters and tracks logistical data.
Administration oversees data related to personnel, and QA
looks at requirements related to both material and personnel.
The system provides the various users with critical
information on work inducting, work screening, work planning,
work scheduling, work issuing, and work progressing. As the
planned work is completed, the planned man-hours for that
work are converted to earned man-hours. The earned man-hours
form the basis for measuring performance. Additionally, the
ETV system provides an accurate measure of personnel
utilization.
Ultimately, SIMA is able to centrally manage respon-
sibility center performance, personnel utilization and most
importantly, make changes to the MCS to ensure maximum output
with the least amount of resources expended. Thus, through
the ETV System, productivity and its measurement are further
defined. [Ref. 25:pp. 1-2— 1-3]
4 . Reporting and Analysis
The ETV system also addresses the reporting and
analysis area of MCS. Weekly, an analysis summary is
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provided to the system users. This report provides data on
performance, utilization, and lost productive time. In addi-
tion, a weekly analysis detail outlines productive man-hour
distribution, productive man-hour indices, deductions from
productive man-hours available, and lost productive time.
Monthly, the analysis summary is provided to users for com-
parison, review, and forecasting. [Ref. 26:pp. 3-5]
The Supply Department also provides requisition status
on all material ordered in support of ship repair. Together,
the ETV summaries and the logistical summary provide key
information on the current operations at SIMA.
External reporting primarily involves statistical
information on individual ship repair. This information is
provided to the ship, RSG, and CNSL. The focus of the report
is the ratio of jobs submitted by the ship to jobs completed
by SIMA. Additional consideration is given to jobs that are
rejected due to lack of parts support, jobs that are outside
the scope of SIMA's repair capability, or jobs that are not
authorized due to higher authority constraints.
C. SUMMARY
The SIMA's MCS system includes all aspects of the organi-
zation. The ETV system encompasses a very complete, well-
integrated data base. The information that management
receives via this Management Information System (MIS) is
useful in balancing all the varied parts of the operation
to achieve the goal of ship repair. The SIMA's MCS is a
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coordinated, integrated system that focuses on ship repair




As outlined in Chapter II, one of the major elements of
the DoD productivity program is productivity measurement.
Productivity measurement in the DoD is an efficiency measure-
ment. Quantifying the outputs and inputs of an activity and
expressing the two as a ratio provides management with a
means to both measure and evaluate their organizations'
productivity. [Ref. 27:p. 21]
All work must first be measured to form a basis for





Educated guesses. [Ref. 28 :p. 159]
In 1980 engineered performance standards were introduced
at Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity (SIMA) , Norfolk,
Virginia. The introduction of these standards, known as
Engineered Time Values (ETV) provided the basis for a new
production management system. The system gives SIMA the
capability to manage work from the point of job induction
through to job completion, and to accurately measure and
analyze productivity. [Ref. 29 :p. 1-1]
The purpose of this chapter is to present the formal
measurement system that exists at SIMA, Norfolk.
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A. ENGINEERED TIME VALUE SYSTEM
At the Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) level
the application of ETV provides the cornerstone for planning
and controlling work and for upgrading the quality and
quantity of work. Utilized in all facets of ship repair,
the ETV System, supported by computer equipment, is able to






Work progressing. [Ref. 30:pp. 1-2]
Planned man-hours are converted to earned man-hours as
work is completed. Earned man-hours represent the actual
man-hours of work completed. The earned man-hour data are
used to measure performance and personnel utilization. To-
gether these two measures provide SIMA with a measure of
productivity. [Ref. 31:pp. 1-2]
B. PRODUCTIVITY MEASUREMENT AND ANALYSIS
Output measurement in a service-oriented organization is
never easy. SIMA is constrained by an operating budget just
like any private sector industrial organization. The ability
to keep ships employable often times requires the use of
outside supply sources when the repair requirement is urgent
and part support within the Navy does not exist. Cost control
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in contracting and procurement under these circumstances is
vital to SIMA's ability to meet the repair needs of the fleet.
Similarly, prudent production practices by first line managers
can affect SIMA's output. Material, personnel, or procedural
waste all affect productivity and are directly related to
SIMA's budget.
Yet for the first-line managers who head SIMA's responsi-
bility centers, extending the repair potential of SIMA's
budget through improved work measurement techniques and labor
saving equipment is not generally viewed as vital to their
performance or their division's productivity.
Before the advent of the ETV system of productivity
measurement at SIMA, performance evaluation was generally
subjective. This type of evaluation has a long-standing
history in many areas of Navy management. Operating without
measurement standards is common. Having measurement standards
and not using them is also common. ETV provides the standards
necessary for quantitative analysis.
1. Performance Standards
A performance standard in the ETV system is the time
it should take to complete an assigned job. Accurate time
measurement considers job conditions, the qualifications of
the individual (s) doing the work, the method of doing the
work and the impact of normal delays. Measurement under these
conditions was an improvement, but the subjectivity of certain
factors led to further refinement. Finally,
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Methods-Time-Measurement (MTM) , which takes basic motions
involved in the performance of a task and assigns time based
on average skill and average conditions, was adopted. [Ref. 32
pp. 1-3] Thus, MTM complements ETV and strengthens the final
analysis product.
2 . Productivity Measurement
Three factors contribute to productivity. They are:
Performance;
Utilization;
- Method. [Ref. 33:p. 3-1]
Performance is obtained when the shop workload is
equal to the available direct labor hours to accomplish
that workload.
j. Earned Man-Hours , _~Performance = XT . ^—-5 r^ * ^—r-i ™ r, x 100Net Productive Available Man-Hours
Utilization is a quantitative expression. It con-
siders how well productive man-hours were utilized in actual
productive assignments.
rTJ^ . , . Net Productive Available Man-Hours lr._Utilization = 3 — s n
—
zn r* r; x 10 °Gross Productive Available Man-Hours
Method is qualitative. This reflects the process of
work planning, knowledge of job requirements, standard
practices, management directives, and traditions. These
factors are usually not considered unless the other two factors
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indicate a need for change. The product of the first two
factors is productivity. [Ref. 34 :p. 3-7]
, , . .. Earned Man-Hours ..__Productivity = - - -5 —. r ^—rn x 100Gross Productive Available Man-Hours
Several elements affect performance and utilization.





The elements affecting utilization are:
Productive support man-hours;
Total deductions from productive man-hours available.
[Ref. 35:p. 3-1]
Variability of workload at SIMA can not be controlled
by the repair division supervisors. If workload could be
controlled, then optimum performance could be realized.
Optimum performance exists when shop workload is equal to the
available direct labor hours to accomplish that workload.
To compensate for the lack of control, an additional factor,
workload performance, was added. Workload performance re-
flects how well shop personnel performed for the week, based
on total work accomplished compared to man-hours assigned to
work. This additional factor enables shop performance to be




, , _ j- Earned Man-Hours
, rt _Workload Performance = „ - ^—5 7-! 5 ^—in r» r; x 100Net Productive Available Man-Hours
- Man-Hours Unassigned to JCN '
s
3 . Productivity Measurement Reporting
Collection of data occurs at the shop level. This
information is essential to the overall measurement of pro-
ductivity. SIMA currently uses Analysis Records and Reports
(ARRS) personnel to supplement the various repair division
personnel in the collection of data. These personnel serve
three purposes:
1. Collection and entry of job progress information;
2. Collection and entry of lost productive time
information;
3. Collection and entry of personnel utilization
information. [Ref. 37:p. 3-3]
Three primary reports result from the collected data
and are used by the various management levels to analyze
productivity. The reports address both divisional and shop
level performance. These reports are:
Weekly ETV Analysis Summary-Performance;
Weekly ETV Analysis Summary-Utilization;
Weekly ETV Analysis Summary-Lost Productive Time.
[Ref. 38:p. 3-5]
These weekly reports provide SIMA's managers with
a means of identifying performance and utilization trends.
As the data base grows, managers are able to eliminate factors
and elements which do not affect productivity, while enhancing
those that show a correlation with the specific performance
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measure being evaluated. At SIMA the implicit benefit is
increased efficiency and improved productivity.
C. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
The previous section addressed the impact quantitative
factors have on productivity. Several factors do not directly
affect productivity measurement, but their impact on the
overall measure of performance and utilization is significant.
Common qualitative factors which affect performance,
utilization and method are:
Management/supervisor attitude;
Shop manning;
Availability of tools and equipment;
Shop forecasting and loading;
Supervisor and technician training. [Ref. 39 :p. 3-36]
During informal interviews with the various supervisors
at SIMA, these same factors and their impact were seen as
major items affecting the overall productivity of their
various divisions and shops.
Specifically, the first line managers at SIMA feel:
The benefits that the ETV system offers to SIMA's
managers is not generally understood. Managers at
SIMA view the ETV system as a means to "look good."
Meeting the goals of the measurement system is impor-
tant because higher management uses the summary
reports to forecast productivity trends.
SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia, interviews with the Repair
Division Officers, August 1985.
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Historically, personnel manning levels are usually
inconsistent with the mission of the activity. The
inconsistencies are either in total numbers, or in
the qualifications held by individuals. The former
are usually shortages, while the latter are a lack of
proper qualifications for the assigned billet.
Availability of proper tools and equipment is tied
closely to the budget and the supply system. Items
not in stock or not carried can affect productivity.
Lack of new, improved, or replacement equipment
items can be the result of poor capital investment
planning, or planned procurements may be impaired
by unavailability of budget dollars.
The time required to train a technician once he or she
has completed required formal training is often offset
by personnel rotations. A common problem for most
activities is justifying the time it takes to qualify
an individual in a position versus the projected tour
length of the same individual. In most commands this
disruptive cycle results in major deficiencies in




SIMA is utilizing the ETV System. Its impact on produc-
tivity is difficult to gauge because:
First line supervisors do not fully understand the
benefit such a system could have on their management
capabilities
.
System users do not believe the results on the weekly
summaries. The results on an ETV summary report
usually reflect lower actual performance percentages
than the supervisor estimates by his subjective analysis
First line supervisors all measure productivity based
on their knowledge of their personnel's potential and
their professional experience.
SIMA's managers use subjective factors to judge their
division and shop performance. The key factors are
those mentioned in the previous segment.
SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia, interviews with the Repair
Division Officers, August 1985.
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The potential impact that the ETV System can have on SIMA
is clear. The present system is a mixture of the ETV
System summary data and the supervisor's "gut feeling."
Trend analysis provides a limited benefit for management,
because the measuring potential of the ETV System is hindered
by the manager's inaccurate and inconsistent method of evaluat-
ing his unit's productivity. The utilization of ARRS per-
sonnel in the divisions negates some of the subjective
influence that currently exists, but full participation is
essential if SIMA is going to:
Continue to meet the repair needs of a growing surface
navy.
Adequately audit its Management Control System (MCS)
and make the necessary adjustments to enhance productivity,
Provide management with an accurate management information
tool.
Adequately justify future procurement requests for
Productivity Enhancement Incentive Fund (PEIF) , Pro-
ductivity Investment Fund (PIF) , or Industrial Plant
Equipment (IPE) funding.
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V. PRODUCTIVITY IMPEDIMENTS AT SIMA
Concern over a general decline in productivity in the
United States prior to 1970 caused Congress, along with
other governmental agencies, to embark on a program designed
to enhance productivity. The program that resulted was in-
tended to enhance productivity through capital investment.
The Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment (PECI) program
sought to enhance Department of Defense (DoD) output, but it
was not until after the inception of the program that the
services realized impediments to productivity existed.
Several governmental studies were undertaken to determine the
source of these impediments. This chapter briefly discusses
the early findings of these studies and then focuses on the
current impediments affecting Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activity (SIMA) , Norfolk.
A. EARLY FINDINGS
In 1974 the term "misdirected incentives" was used to
describe incentive structures within organizations that cause
people to act contrary to established norms within the organi-
zation. Such contradictory action was generally related to
three factors:
1. The measurement system. Managers concern themselves
only with the items affecting their performance evalu-
ation and those items that will make them "look good."
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2. The reward system. Managers will act to enhance their
own interests over the good of the organization.
3. The personal characteristics of individual managers.
In some instances managers actions cause subordinates
to act opposite to their good judgment. An example
is the situation where a subordinate fails to report
bad news because of the reaction he or she receives
from the manager. [Ref. 40: p. 1]
In 1978, a conference was held to discuss the issues
which impacted most on military productivity. The key issues
identified were:
1. Lack of effective ways to measure productivity;
2. Lack of an adequate reward system;
3. Systems that pose negative incentives for those who
enhance productivity;
4. Personnel promotions on technical competency alone;
5. Inadequate relations between management and unions
on issues of productivity;
6. Disruptive rotations of military and civilian managers;
7. Lack of training and development of career civilians;
8. Need for better relations between civilians and military
managers
;
9. Excessive use of inspections and audits;
10. Inappropriate use of management information and reporting
systems which leads to counterproductive behavior;
11. Lack of capital investment; and
12. Lack of supply support. [Ref. 41:p. 3]
The early discussions and conferences on the problems of
productivity enhancement appear to have converged on one
issue, the internal impediments within an organization.
Shortcomings in productivity in the DoD initially appeared to
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be related to inefficiencies in general output as was dis-
cussed in Chapter II. Employment of capital investment tech-
niques to improve work output has been and still is overshadowed
by the existing impediments in Navy organizations. Capital
investment is a factor that can enhance productivity if the
local impediments are removed.
B. CURRENT IMPEDIMENTS AT SIMA
The SIMA's impediments that exist generally fall into
three categories:
Impediments that could be controlled by the local
management;
Impediments that are common to more than one organiza-
tion or activity in the Navy;
Impediments that are unique to SIMA.
A series of informal interviews conducted at SIMA, Norfolk
in August 1985 with various first line managers is the basis
for the remaining discussion. Since the issue concerns pro-
ductivity and the effect of impediments on the improvement
of productivity, most of the sampling was conducted in the
repair department.
1 . Management and Local Impediments
a. Erratic Workload
Several divisions cited problems that arise from
uneven workload flow. Although most of these fluctuations
in shop workload can be attributed to outside elements in
the organizational environment, particularly the priorities
set by the operational fleet commanders, most of the first-line
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managers felt more internal effort should be made to smooth
12
the controllable workload.
The erratic workload results in personnel being
temporarily assigned to other shops within the division or
transferred to other divisions. Skill development is re-
duced through personnel placement changes. Productivity
standards suffer from the constant changes which occur in
divisional manning levels. Ultimately, managers are faced
with morale problems. The changing tempo of fleet operations,
irregular submission of components for repair by fleet units,
and funding constraints all affect work induction. At peak
points of work induction, managers are forced to schedule
overtime to compensate for the additional workload require-
ments. Thus, inability to manage workload impacts most heavily
on productivity, morale, and skill development,
b. Management Knowledge
Knowledge of the PECI program and its potential
benefits is non-existent among first line managers at SIMA.
In order for a program to work effectively, the purpose and
objective must be understood by the members of the organiza-
tion. At SIMA, the supply officer, has the only knowledge
about the program. Except for the annual Other Procurement
Navy (OPN) budget call that comes down from the Commander,
12 SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia, interview with the Repair
Officer, August 1985.
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Naval Surface Forces Atlantic (CNSL) no promotion of the
13PECI program generally occurs at SIMA.
Compounding the lack of knowledge about the PECI
program is the general knowledge first line managers have
about the Industrial Plant Equipment (IPE) process. At SIMA,
PECI and IPE are synonymous among first-line managers. Lead
time frustrations generally result from using IPE, when PECI
could have provided in-year results.
2 . Management and Outside Impediments
a. Personnel Rotation
Military rotations and their effect on an activity's
productivity are not isolated just to the SIMA at Norfolk.
Personnel rotations have long been a routine problem for
managers in the Navy. Command retention programs focus most
of their attention on identifying top performers. Although
the career opportunities for these select few people are
numerous, most commands will go to considerable lengths to
retain these quality performers onboard for a second tour or
an extension. Generally, these same personnel are also on
the critical ratings list, which means shortages already exist.
Additionally, the need to keep operational billets manned to
100 percent poses further hardships on a shore command like
SIMA, which typically retains a technician for two or three
years instead of the typical four to six year tours common on
sea duty.
13
SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia, interview with the Supply
Officer, August 1985.
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In managerial positions at SIMA this hardship is
further compounded. During a typical two year assignment a
leader must learn what his or her job is all about and then
gain the confidence of his or her subordinates if his or her
contributions will be useful.
A final consideration on rotations and the over-
all issue of shortages poses a third dilemma. Often rotation
of personnel results in gapped billets. Currently at SIMA,
the repair department is short three officers and most of the
divisions are managed by senior chiefs or master chiefs in-
14
stead of a commissioned officer.
b. Cost-Benefit Analysis
The PECI program requires that a formalized request
be submitted if an activity desires to make a capital acquisi-
tion using one of the available PECI funds. This justifica-
tion entails detailed analysis of the cost of the equipment
versus the projected benefit. No one at SIMA or any other
similar activity is formally trained to perform such analysis.
The supply officer, who is the most likely candidate, has not
been trained to do cost-benefit analysis since the curriculum
at supply school does not offer this training. Typically,
if a supply officer or any other manager has such a skill,
he or she has attained this training on his or her own time.
Thus, the resulting cost estimates and forecasted pay-back
14 . . .SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia, interview with the Repair
Division Officers, August 1985.
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amortization data are generally inaccurate and potentially
will never provide the suggested savings quoted in the
commands original proposal.
At SIMA these analyses have been prepared by
various individuals. The most recent individual was a first
class petty officer in the supply department. Although his
efforts were thorough, he also lacked the requisite training
necessary to present a sound justification.
A secondary problem that occurs in the rough work-
up of the proposal is data collection. At SIMA the engineered
time value (ETV) system is the only source of productivity
data available. Because the system is new and lacks credi-
bility among the users, the validity of data is also question-
able. Thus, the problem of productivity measurement further
accentuates the analysis problem at SIMA.
Lack of meaningful data and insufficient training
deter activities from submitting proposals. Beneficial sugges-
tions from the workers are stagnated by the frustrations of
a program that is not "user friendly."
c. Work Attitudes
The personnel at SIMA generally displayed a posi-
tive attitude toward their jobs. In most instances the nega-
tive attitudes were directly attributable to the impediments
previously discussed. Encountering the same obstacles over
SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia, interview with the Assistant
Supply Officer, August 1985.
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and over again tended to dampen enthusiasm among the workers
and managers. Because PECI is virtually unknown at SIMA, it
is difficult to assess the positive or negative impact such a
program .would have on these same individuals.
3 . Unique Management Impediments
a. Differences Within a Class of Ships
The SIMA services approximately a dozen classes
of ships. Generally the equipment in each class is the same.
Ship construction locations vary within classes and this can
result in subtle differences among ships of the same class.
Also, each time a ship is overhauled, modifications result
that further separate the ship's original class specifications
into unique problems for activities like SIMA.
As a result, SIMA now has to deal with each ship
as if it were a unique class. Efficiency in repair, produc-
tion standards, and management's ability to plan work are all
impediments to productivity because no two ships in the same
class are alike.
Technical manuals and blueprints often do not
agree with the current installation. Delays are encountered,
workloads vary, and workers are frustrated by the obstacles
the system poses during each repair availability.
b. Inadequate Repair Equipment
The differences in ships that was addressed in
the last section causes another unique dilemma. Equipment
SIMA, Norfolk, Virginia, interview with the Repair
Division Officers, August 1985.
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alterations and modifications often precede equipment update
at SIMA. The most critical problem occurs within the elec-
trical and electronic divisions. The impact on productivity
is detrimental. Ships come into availability only to discover
that SIMA lacks the capability to repair new or altered
equipment. Left with no alternative, the type desk or the
Readiness Support Group (RSG) which screens jobs, is left
with only one option, utilization of an outside contract.
This usually means delays in repair and excessive costs.
Increased costs of outside repair decrease the productive
capacity of SIMA and the limitations imposed by Congressional
budget constraints further shrinks the productive capacity of
SIMA's budget dollar.
The current shipbuilding program in the Navy also
compounds this problem. New classes of ships are generally
operational before adequate parts support is available. These
same ships often report for duty without a complete set of
blueprints or technical manuals. Refurbished units such as
the battleships suffer from the ills of inactive service and
the major structural changes that occur in the reactivation
and modernization process. Thus, for SIMA, productivity
enhancement is impeded by the uniqueness of the repair problem.
C. IMPEDIMENT CONCLUSIONS
The current impediments have changed very little from
the initial ones that blocked the success of the Navy's pro-
gram in the 1970 's. The productivity program needs to address
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the current impediments first. Capital investment posed
against the existing obstacles will continue to be ineffective
as an enhancing element in the repair of ships at the SIMA.
Until the first line managers at SIMA are made aware of the
PECI program and its benefits, the objectives and goals of
a productivity initiative will remain ineffective. Continued
growth of the surface Navy will require the SIMA at Norfolk to
expand and modernize to meet future needs. The impediments
will not solve themselves, nor will ship repair provide quality




An effort has been made in this study to examine the
nature of the Productivity Enhancing Capital Investment
(PECI) program at Shore Intermediate Maintenance Activity
(SIMA) through its history, its problems, and its future. The
history is clear. The trends describe accurately how the
PECI program has evolved to its present condition. The out-
look for the future, if the trends are allowed to continue,
is not good. Action needs to be taken. As can be seen by
analyzing the effects of past studies, history is repeating
itself. The program goals and objectives have not changed.
Current auditing of the program indicates that the same
shortcomings which initially weakened the overall Department
of Defense (DoD) productivity program still exist.
In making decisions regarding the future of the PECI
program, one needs to evaluate the goals or objectives that
are intended to be achieved. Are the goals the same as stated
in 19 73, or have they changed? Are PECI funded equipments
at SIMA attaining the desired benefits? Is the program use
at SIMA representative of the Navy's program in general?
Is there sufficient input from SIMA or any Naval activity on
a yearly basis to justify continued maintenance of the availa-
ble funding? Unfortunately the answer to all of these
questions, except for the first one, is no.
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SIMA will continue to repair ships. The productive output
might not be as high as it could have been under a success-
ful PECI program. That is fine as long as the resource
quantities and number of ships remains constant or declines.
Examine the current trends in Naval ship construction.
If the current number of ships grows to a 600 ship Navy as
planned, would the productive capacity at SIMA be able to
sustain that number of ships? If the number of Naval bases
increases to complement this increase in ship numbers as is
scheduled, would available resources support the development
of a SIMA in each of these ports? If co-location of a SIMA
at each new port did not occur, would SIMA's current produc-
tive capacity meet the increased needs of a more dispersed
fleet? These are distinct possibilities. The Navy can not
afford to let the productive output of any SIMA decline.
B. EVALUATION OF SIMA'S CURRENT PROGRAM
1. SIMA's Role
The SIMA at Norfolk does not have an active PECI
program. In Fiscal Year 1984 SIMA submitted one project for
Productivity Enhancing Incentive Fund (PEIF) review and the
funding was denied. At the time of the author's visit there
was one proposal in progress, which was the only submission
for Fiscal Year 1985. In Fiscal Year 1984 only 9 PEIF projects
were approved in the entire Navy, and these submissions came
from only 7 commands [Ref. 42]. Thus, not only is SIMA's
56






Information flow and instructional guidance from
higher level commands to Commander, Naval Surface Forces
Atlantic (CNSL) is generally clear. Internally, SIMA first
line managers equate productivity enhancement with the
Industrial Plant Equipment (IPE) program. Between the first
line managers and CNSL the knowledge of Other Procurement,
Navy (OPN) funding and the various programs which fall under
OPN is weak, except for the supply officer. One of the initial
goals of the PECI program was to "promote productivity at all
levels of management," and the level that should be most aware
of the PECI program is totally unaware. Lack of knowledge
among first line managers is the number one impediment to
the existing PECI program.
3 The Other Impediments
Except for the apparent lack of knowledge concerning
the PECI program at SIMA, the other impediments such as work-
load, personnel rotation, and weaknesses in economic analysis
have existed from the start. SIMA has acted to decrease the
impact that workload has on its personnel. Divisions that are
historically always overloaded, such as the pipe shop or
valve shop, have gone to shift work. In addition, reserve
implementation on drill weekends is providing substantial input
to the overall output of SIMA's productive potential.
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4 . Productivity Measurement
Standardized measurement of productivity is substan-
tially better at SIMA under the Engineered Time Values (ETV)
system, but without support from first line managers, the
likelihood that divisional productivity will remain a quali-
tative measure, heavily influenced by the division officer's
"gut feeling," is extremely high.
Without a good standard for measurement, the Manage-
ment Control System (MCS) at SIMA will remain ineffective in
resource utilization. A sound MCS at SIMA is vital; without
it the efficiency of management and the resulting ability of
SIMA to effectively manage its primary goal of ship repair is
highly questionable.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
PECI is an integrated program that exists at all levels
within the Navy. If the program is going to survive the
watchful eye of Congress, the base commands are going to have
to work towards the goals and objectives initially established
in 1973. SIMA should establish a PECI program. This goal
can be achieved by:
(1) Establishing a productivity enhancing committee;
(2) Providing all levels of SIMA management with a
detailed brief on the intent of the PECI program;
(3) Providing recognition for users of the program;
(4) Obtaining cost-benefit training for first line
managers
;
(5) Using the ETV system to standardize measurements;
(6) Using productivity to evaluate the effectiveness of
SIMA's responsibility centers.
In conclusion, if PECI is going to enhance productivity
at SIMA, the program must receive the support of all personnel
all of the time. Outputs can not increase from a dwindling
supply of limited resources without an aggressive effort
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